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1 Introduction
One of the most fruitful applications of game theory into political sciences is the study of power
in decision making bodies. Typically, power is understood as the ability of an agent to affect the
outcome of a voting procedure. A number of power indices have been proposed in the literature
to quantify this ability. The most relevant of these measures are the Shapley-Shubik index
(Shapley and Shubik, 1954) and the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf, 1964). Both of them build on a
common underlying assumption: members of a legislature (be they individuals or parties) may
form coalitions, and a coalition is winning if and only if the votes of its members account for
at least as many as an exogenously given threshold (most often the majority). Accordingly, the
bargaining possibilities of the members of a legislature can be described by a simple coalitional
game, which assigns 1 to winning coalitions and 0 to the rest.
Nevertheless, quite often there are voting procedures in legislatures in which endogenous
majority rules are used instead of fixed majority rules. For instance, when the proclamation of
the president is a duty of the parliament and no candidate receives the support of at least half
of the legislature, governments backed by only a minority of the legislators may be formed.1 In
these cases, the minority government takes hold because the parties that do not back it cannot
agree on voting in favor of an alternative candidate. When endogenous voting rules apply, the
bargaining possibilities of the parties cannot be fully captured by a coalitional game. The reason
is the following: whether a coalition of parties is winning or not is not only determined by how
many seats the coalition has, but also by the voting strategies of the remaining parties.
To encompass situations like the previous one, Thrall and Lucas (1963) devised the so-called
partition function form games. In a partition function form game, the value of a coalition
depends on how the players outside the coalition are organized, hence allowing for externalities
to be incorporated into the framework of coalitional games. Some years later, Myerson (1977)
proposed and characterized an extension of the Shapley value for partition function form games.
It has only been in the later times, however, that these games have gained importance and
some relevant contributions on the topic have been made. For instance, Hafalir (2007) studies
the core of coalitional games with externalities and obtains necessary conditions for its non-
emptiness. The problem of extending the Shapley value to games in partition function form has
captured great attention and several alternatives to Myerson (1977) have been proposed. First,
Macho-Stadler et al. (2007) characterize a value that can be obtained as the Shapley payoffs of
an average game. Second, de Clippel and Serrano (2008) follow an axiomatic approach to single
out a value that is not affected by externalities. Third, Dutta et al. (2010) provide a family of
values using the notion of potential and characterize it by means of a reduced game property
(see Hart and Mas-Colell (1989)). Other recent contributions include Albizuri et al. (2005) and
Pham Do and Norde (2007). To the best of our knowledge, however, no extension of the Banzhaf
1For instance, this is the current situation of the regional governments of the Basque Country and Catalonia.
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value has been yet proposed within the framework of all games in partition function form.
The Banzhaf value was first proposed for voting games (Banzhaf, 1964; Penrose, 1946) and
later on extended to the class of all coalitional games by Owen (1975). As for the Shapley value,
marginal contributions of players to coalitions are the basis of the Banzhaf value. However,
whereas the Shapley value considers orderings of players, the Banzhaf value considers coalitions
of players. From an axiomatic perspective, the main difference is that the Shapley value is
efficient while the Banzhaf value satisfies interesting amalgamation neutrality properties (Haller,
1994; Nowak, 1997; Casajus, 2012).
In the first part of this paper, we propose a family of values for arbitrary games in partition
function form that are obtained by applying the Banzhaf value to an expected coalitional game.
Our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of possible coalition structures
that may arise for any given set of players. Then, we provide two characterization results of
these values by means of an appealing amalgamation neutrality property.
In the second part of the paper, we focus on partition function form games which are simple.
As the collusion transformation used in the above characterization results fails to be meaningful
for this subclass of games, we propose another family of values for arbitrary games of parti-
tion function form which are obtained by applying the Banzhaf value to a different expected
coalitional game. These latter values are then characterized similarly as the former ones, with
the modification that the previous amalgamation property is substituted by a different version
that uses a collusion transformation for which simple games are closed. Both families of values
coincide when there are no externalities.
We note that, in the framework of simple games with externalities, different extensions of
the Banzhaf value have been studied. The paper with the most similar motivation to ours
is Bolger (1990), where an extension of the Banzhaf value is proposed and characterized for
multi-candidate voting games. Specifically, Bolger (1990) studies values that can be defined as
weighted averages of marginal contributions, and he characterizes one particular value. When
restricted to simple games, our family of indices is not included within the class of values studied
by Bolger (1990), although, very interestingly, it satisfies the dummy-independence property of
his characterization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the first family of
values for games in partition function form. In Section 3, we prove two characterization results.
In Section 4, we turn our interest to simple games in partition function form, and we present
and characterize the second family of values for games in partition function form.
2 A Banzhaf-based value
Let Ω be a (possibly infinite) set of potential players. We denote by N ⊆ Ω any finite set of
players in Ω. We denote the cardinality of N by n. A partition of N , denoted by P , is a division
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of N into pairwise disjoint coalitions, i.e., P ⊆ {S : S ⊆ N} such that ∪S∈P = N and for every
S, T ∈ P with S 6= T , S ∩ T = ∅. By convenience, we assume that the empty set is an element
of every partition. We denote by P(N) the set of all partitions of the finite set N . An embedded
coalition of N is a pair (S, P ) where P ∈ P(N) and S ∈ P . The set of embedded coalitions of
N is ECN = {(S, P ) : P ∈ P(N) and S ∈ P}. Given S ⊆ N and i ∈ N , S−i (resp. S+i) stands
for the set S \ {i} (resp. S ∪ {i}). Similarly, given P ∈ P(N) and S ∈ P , P−S ∈ P(N \ S)
denotes the partition P \ {S}.
A game in partition function form (or simply a game) is a pair (N, v), where N ⊆ Ω and
v is a function that assigns to every embedded coalition its “worth”, i.e., v : ECN → R, with
the convention that for every P ∈ P(N), v(∅, P ) = 0. The set of all games in partition function
form with common player set N is denoted by GN . The set of games in partition function form
with an arbitrary set of players is denoted by G, i.e., G = {GN : N ⊆ Ω}. For each N ⊆ Ω, GN
is a vector space. Let (N, e(S,P )) ∈ GN be the game defined for every (T,Q) ∈ ECN by
e(S,P )(T,Q) =
1 if S ⊆ T and ∀T ′ ∈ Q−T ,∃S′ ∈ P such that T ′ ⊆ S′,0 otherwise. (1)
From de Clippel and Serrano (2008), we know that {(N, e(S,P )) : (S, P ) ∈ ECN and S 6= ∅}
constitutes a basis of GN . Lastly, given H ⊆ G, a value on H is any mapping, f, that assigns to
every game (N, v) ∈ H a vector f(N, v) ∈ RN .
2.1 A family of values
In the following, we define a new family of values for games in partition function form. To do
so, we require further concepts. For every N ⊆ Ω, let λN : ECN → R+ be such that for every
S ⊆ N , ∑
P∈P(N):S∈P
λN (S, P ) = 1.
I.e., λN yields, for any S ⊆ N , a probability distribution over the set {(R,P ) ∈ ECN : R = S}.
Alternatively, we can interpret that λN contains the frequencies with which different coalition
structures arise. This second interpretation has a special appeal when we consider the example
of the legislature outlined in the Introduction. Indeed, coalitions formed in a parliament among
parties vary depending on the bill being voted, and hence λN summarizes the average behavior
of parties in terms of voting alliances.
We impose two technical conditions. First, we require that the above distributions depend
only on the set of players not in S, i.e., for every N,N ′ ⊆ Ω, S ⊆ N , S′ ⊆ N ′, (S, P ) ∈ ECN
and (S′, P ′) ∈ ECN ′ such that P−S = P ′−S′ ,
λN (S, P ) = λN
′
(S′, P ′). (2)
4
We denote by Λ any set of collections of probability distributions, one for each possible player
set, satisfying Eq. (2), i.e.,
Λ =
{
λN : N ⊆ Ω, satisfying Eq. (2)} . (3)
The idea behind (3) is to assume that there is an exogenously given belief on how any set of
players organizes itself into a coalition structure.
Second, we say that Λ is consistent if for every N ⊆ Ω, j ∈ N , and (S, P ) ∈ ECN−j ,
λN−j (S, P ) =
∑
T∈P−S
λN (S, P−T ∪ T+j). (4)
Thus, Λ is consistent if given some S ⊆ N−j , the probability that players in N−j\S are organized
according to P−S is independent of whether we consider j or not. Lastly, we use L to denote
the set of all consistent Λ. We stress that there exist infinitely many such Λ.
Example 2.1. In this example, we introduce two possible beliefs, Λ, that satisfy Eqs. (2) and
(4). By notational convenience, for N ⊆ Ω and S ⊆ N , let (S, ∗) ∈ ECN and (S, ∗∗) ∈ ECN
be such that ∗ = {∅, S,N \ S} ∈ P(N) and ∗∗ = {∅, S, {i}i∈N\S} ∈ P(N). Define Λ∗ to be such
that for every N ⊆ Ω and (S, P ) ∈ ECN ,
λN (S, P ) =
1 if (S, P ) = (S, ∗),0 otherwise.
Similarly, let Λ∗∗ be such that for every N ⊆ Ω and (S, P ) ∈ ECN ,
λN (S, P ) =
1 if (S, P ) = (S, ∗∗),0 otherwise.
It is straightforward to see that Λ∗,Λ∗∗ ∈ L. In a monotone context, Λ∗ represents the pessimistic
belief, whereas Λ∗∗ is the optimistic one. In such a context, they constitute the two polar cases.
Following the average approach used in Macho-Stadler et al. (2007), given Λ ∈ L, N ⊆ Ω and
(N, v) ∈ GN , we can associate a number with any coalition S ⊆ N by considering the expected
worth of S in (N, v) according to λN ∈ Λ, i.e.2
vΛ(S) =
∑
P∈P(N):S∈P
λN (S, P ) · v(S, P ). (5)
In a sense, we have incorporated to the game the beliefs on the possible externalities that may
arise. We are now in the position to introduce our family of values, one for every Λ ∈ L.
2Note that we are actually associating a coalitional game with every game in partition function form.
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Definition 2.1. Given Λ ∈ L, the Λ-Banzhaf value, BaΛ, is the value defined for every (N, v) ∈
G and i ∈ N by
BaΛi (N, v) =
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N−i
[
vΛ(S+i)− vΛ(S)
]
. (6)
The values in (6) are built by means of a two-step procedure. First, the beliefs obtained from
Λ are used to define the average coalitional game (N, vΛ). Second, we consider the Banzhaf value
of the latter game. Observe that, even though our approach is very similar to Macho-Stadler
et al. (2007), the assumptions on the weights differ from those they consider. The reason is that
we work with variable player sets, as the next section will make it more evident. Moreover, we
do not consider that the above weights are independent of the identity of the players.
3 Characterizations of the Λ-Banzhaf value
In what follows, we consider some properties that a value for games in partition function form
may satisfy. In order to introduce the first two properties, we consider an adaptation of the
dummy player property to our setting. Given Λ ∈ L and N ⊆ Ω, we say that i ∈ N is a
Λ-dummy player in (N, v) ∈ G if for every S ⊆ N−i,
vΛ(S+i)− vΛ(S) = vΛ({i}), (7)
or, equivalently, ∑
P∈P(N):S+i∈P
λN (S+i, P ) · v(S+i, P )−
∑
P∈P(N):S∈P
λN (S, P ) · v(S, P )
=
∑
P∈P(N):{i}∈P
λN ({i}, P ) · v({i}, P ).
That is, i is a Λ-dummy player in (N, v) ∈ G if the value she expects to add to any coalition is,
according to the probability distribution given by Λ, equal to the value she expects to obtain
when she remains a singleton.
Λ-dpp Given Λ ∈ L, a value, f, satisfies the Λ-dummy player property if for every N ⊆ Ω and
(N, v) ∈ GN such that i ∈ N is a Λ-dummy player in (N, v),
fi(N, v) = vΛ({i}).
For convenience, we consider coalitional games (without externalities) as a subclass of games
in partition function form. Formally, (N, v) ∈ G is a coalitional game if for every S ⊆ N and
(S, P1), (S, P2) ∈ ECN with P1 6= P2,
v(S, P1) = v(S, P2).
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In the case of coalitional games, we may simply denote by v(S) the worth obtained by any
coalition S ⊆ N , which is independent of how the remaining players organize themselves. The
set of all coalitional games with common player set N ⊆ Ω is denoted by CGN . If we let
CG = ∪N⊆ΩCGN , we have CG ⊆ G. Note that if (N, v) ∈ CG, i.e. there are no externalities,
vΛ = v. In this later case, if a player i ∈ N is a Λ-dummy player in (N, v) for some Λ ∈ L then
it is so for every Λ′ ∈ L. In such a situation, we will simply say that i is a dummy player in
(N, v) with no reference to Λ. Next, we introduce a weaker version of Λ-dpp, obtained from
demanding it only to games in CG.
dpp(w) A value, f, satisfies the dummy player property in the weak sense if for every N ⊆ Ω,
(N, v) ∈ CG such that i ∈ N is a dummy player in (N, v),
fi(N, v) = v({i}).
In the following, we introduce a property that considers a certain merging of players. Given
Λ ∈ L, N ⊆ Ω, i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j, and (N, v) ∈ GN , the {ij}-reduced game, which we denote
by (N−j , v(Λ,ij)) ∈ GN−j , is defined for every (S, P ) ∈ ECN−j by3
v(Λ,ij)(S, P ) =

v(S+j , P−S ∪ S+j) if i ∈ S,
∑
T∈P−S
λN (S,P−T∪T+j)·v(S,P−T∪T+j)∑
T∈P−S
λN (S,P−T∪T+j)
if i /∈ S,
(8)
if
∑
T∈P−S λ
N (S, P−T ∪ T+j) > 0 and
v(Λ,ij)(S, P ) =
v(S+j , P−S ∪ S+j) if i ∈ S,0 if i /∈ S, (9)
otherwise. That is, (N−j , v(Λ,ij)) is the resulting game in partition function form obtained from
(N, v) when j delegates her role on i. More precisely, when i participates in a given coalition,
then j goes along with her. However, when i does not participate in a coalition we compute
the expected value that is obtained when j joins any other coalition updating the beliefs with
Bayes’ rule. When no confusion may arise we will denote (N−j , v(Λ,ij)) simply by (N−j , vij).
Λ-dnp Given Λ ∈ L, a value, f, satisfies the Λ-delegation neutrality property if for every N ⊆ Ω,
(N, v) ∈ G, and i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j,
fi(N, v) + fj(N, v) = fi(N−j , v(Λ,ij)).
3We recall that ∅ is a member of any partition.
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A version of the above property is first considered in the framework of coalitional games with
no externalities by Haller (1994). Recently, Casajus (2012) used the latter to characterize the
Banzhaf value.4 In the particular case of two-player games, i.e., when N = {i, j} with i 6= j,
externalities cannot arise as the only partitions are {∅, {i}, {j}} and {∅, {i, j}}. Hence, the set
of games in partition function form coincides in this case with the set of coalitional games. The
property below only applies to two-player games.
2-psp A value, f, satisfies the 2-player standard payoff property if for every i, j ∈ Ω with i 6= j
and ({i, j}, v) ∈ G{i,j},
fi({i, j}, v) = 12 [v({i, j}) + v({i})− v({j})] .
A value satisfying 2-psp gives for two-player games the payoffs prescribed by many common
solution concepts, like the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value or the nucleolus.
In the following we prove a series of results which lead to two characterization results of the
family of Λ-Banzhaf values by means of Λ-dnp.
Proposition 3.1. Let Λ ∈ L. Then, the Λ-Banzhaf value satisfies Λ-dpp, Λ-dnp and 2-psp.
Proof. Let N ⊆ Ω, (N, v) ∈ GN and i ∈ N . First, if i is a Λ-dummy player in (N, v),
BaΛi (N, v) =
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N−i
[
vΛ(S+i)− vΛ(S)
]
= 12n−1
∑
S⊆N−i
vΛ({i}) = vΛ({i}),
where the first equality holds by definition of BaΛ and the second equality from the fact that i
is a Λ-dummy player in (N, v). Second, let j ∈ N−i. Then,5
BaΛi (N, v) + BaΛj (N, v) =Bai(N, vΛ) + Baj(N, vΛ) = Bai(N−j , (vΛ)ij)
=Bai(N−j , (vij)Λ) = BaΛi (N−j , vij),
(10)
where the first and last equalities hold from the definition of BaΛ, the second equality holds
because Ba satisfies the 2-efficiency property for coalitional games as considered in Casajus
(2012), and the third equality holds if
(vΛ)ij = (vij)Λ. (11)
Hence, it only remains to prove Eq. (11). Let i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j, and S ⊆ N−j . We distinguish
two cases.
4See Alonso-Meijide et al. (2012) for a comparison in the framework of coalitional games with no externalities
between this property and the 2-efficiency property considered by Nowak (1997).
5We denote by Ba the Banzhaf value of coalitional games. We note that it can be defined for every (N, v) ∈ CG
by Ba(N, v) = BaΛ(N, v), where Λ ∈ L is arbitrary. The {ij}-reduced game for coalitional games is then
independent of Λ and coincides with the one used in Casajus (2012).
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Case 1: i ∈ S.
On the one hand,
(vΛ)ij(S) = vΛ(S+j) =
∑
P ′∈P(N):S+j∈P ′
λN (S+j , P ′) · v(S+j , P ′).
On the other hand,
(vij)Λ(S) =
∑
P∈P(N−j):S∈P
λN−j (S, P ) · vij(S, P )
=
∑
P∈P(N−j):S∈P
λN−j (S, P ) · v(S+j , P−S ∪ S+j).
We note that by setting P ′ = P−S ∪ S+j , we define a one-to-one correspondence between
the set of partitions P ∈ P(N−j) such that S ∈ P and the set of partitions P ′ ∈ P(N)
such that S+j ∈ P ′. Hence, from the two expressions above and Eq. (2) it follows that
(vΛ)ij(S) = (vij)Λ(S).
Case 2: i /∈ S.
On the one hand,
(vΛ)ij(S) = vΛ(S) =
∑
P∈P(N):S∈P
λN (S, P ) · v(S, P )
=
∑
P∈P(N−j):S∈P
 ∑
T∈P−S
λN (S, P−T ∪ T+j) · v(S, P−T ∪ T+j)
 .
On the other hand,
(vij)Λ(S) =
∑
P∈P(N−j):S∈P
λN−j (S, P ) · vij(S, P )
=
∑
P∈P(N−j):S∈P
λN−j (S, P ) ·
∑T∈P−S λN (S, P−T ∪ T+j) · v(S, P−T ∪ T+j)∑
T∈P−S
λN (S, P−T ∪ T+j)

=
∑
P∈P(N−j):S∈P
 λN−j (S, P )∑
T∈P−S
λN (S, P−T ∪ T+j)

 ∑
T∈P−S
λN (S, P−T ∪ T+j) · v(S, P−T ∪ T+j)
 ,
where the first (maybe empty) summation after the second equality is taken only for those
P ∈ P(N−j) such that
∑
T∈P−S λ
N (S, P−T ∪T+j) > 0. When the summation is empty we
set it to zero. Under Eq. (4), we obtain (vΛ)ij(S) = (vij)Λ(S).
Third, and last, it is trivial to check that the Λ-Banzhaf value satisfies 2-psp.
Next, we provide for every Λ ∈ L two characterizations of the Λ-Banzhaf value in the
framework of all games in partition function form.
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Proposition 3.2. Let Λ ∈ L. There is at most one value that satisfies dpp(w) and Λ-dnp.
Proof. Before showing the desired result, we note that {eN(S,∗) : S ⊆ N and S 6= ∅} forms a basis
of the vector subspace CGN .6 Additionally, it is useful to describe how the elements of this basis
are affected by the merging of players. Indeed, for every N ⊆ Ω, i, j ∈ N and S ⊆ N , it holds
that
(eN(S,∗))ij =
e
N−j
(S,∗) if i /∈ S and j /∈ S,
e
N−j
(S−j ,∗) otherwise.
(12)
First, we prove uniqueness for two-player games.7 W.l.o.g., let N = {1, 2} ⊆ Ω and take
(N, v) ∈ G{1,2}. Then, there are λ1, λ2, λ12 ∈ R such that
v = λ1 · e({1},∗) + λ2 · e({2},∗) + λ12 · e(N,∗).
Let M = {1, 2, 3, 4} and (M, z) ∈ GM be defined by
z = (λ1 − λ2) · e({4},∗) + λ2 ·
∑
l∈{1,2,3}
(e({l},∗) − e(N\{l,4},∗)) + (λ12 + 2λ2) · e({1,2,3},∗). (13)
Using (12), it easily follows that
z13 = z23 = (λ1 − λ2) · e({4},∗) + λ2 ·
(
e({1},∗) + e({2},∗)
)
+ λ12 · e({1,2},∗).
Let now (M−3, w) ∈ GM−3 , where w = z13. By Λ-dnp,
f1(M−3, w) = f1(M−3, z13) = f1(M, z) + f3(M, z) (14)
and
f2(M−3, w) = f1(M−3, z23) = f2(M, z) + f3(M, z). (15)
From (12) it follows that 1 is a dummy player in the weak sense in ((M−3)−2, w12), implying
that
2λ2 + λ12 = f1((M−3)−2, w12) = f1(M−3, w) + f2(M−3, w)
= f1(M, z) + f2(M, z) + 2f3(M, z), (16)
where the first equality holds by dpp(w), the second equality by Λ-dnp and the last equality is
due to Eqs. (14) and (15). As 1, 2, and 3 play symmetric roles in z, we can repeat the procedure
above exchanging the roles of the three players in the definition of z to obtain
f1(M, z) = f2(M, z) = f3(M, z) =
λ2
2 +
λ12
4 .
6It is equivalent to the classical basis of coalitional games defined on the set N consisting of unanimity games.
7This part is based on the proof of Theorem 7 in Casajus (2012).
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Note that, by plugging the above equation into Eqs. (14) and (15), we obtain f1(M−3, w) =
λ2 + λ122 . As (M−3, w) ∈ CGM−3 and 4 is a dummy player in the weak sense in (M−3, w), by
dpp(w) we have
f4(M−3, w) = λ1 − λ2.
Lastly, observe that (M−3)−4 = {1, 2} and, by Eq. (12),
w14 = λ1 · e({1},∗) + λ2 · e({2},∗) + λ12 · e({1,2},∗) = v.
As a consequence,
f1(N, v) = f1(M−3, w) + f4(M−3, w) = λ1 +
λ12
2 ,
where the second equality holds by Λ-dnp. Observe that, from (12), we have
v12 = (λ1 + λ2 + λ12) · e(1,∗).
Since ({1}, v12) ∈ G{1} and 1 is a dummy player in the weak sense in ({1}, v12),
λ1 + λ2 + λ12 = f1({1}, v12) = f1(N, v) + f2(N, v),
where the last equality holds by Λ-dnp. Therefore, f2(v) = λ2 + λ122 . All in all, we have seen
that f(N, v) = Ba(N, v).
Second, suppose that uniqueness holds for every (N ′, v) ∈ GN ′ where |N ′| < n (with n > 2)
and let (N, v) ∈ GN .8 By Λ-dnp, it holds, for every i, j ∈ N ,
fi(N, v) + fj(N, v) = fi(N−j , vij). (17)
The right-hand side of Eq. (17) is unique by the inductive hypothesis. Since Eq. (17) holds for
every pair i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j, we have a system of (n2) equations and n unknown variables.
It is easy to check that the system has at most one solution. Moreover, by Proposition 3.1 the
system is compatible.
A careful analysis of the proof reveals that the result in Proposition 3.2 remains true even if
we restrict dpp(w) to apply only to games (N, v) ∈ GN where n ≤ 4. The following result is a
straightforward consequence of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
Theorem 3.1. Let Λ ∈ L. The Λ-Banzhaf value is the unique value on G that satisfies Λ-dnp
and dpp(w).9
The next result shows that the Λ-Banzhaf value can be characterized without the need of a
dummy player property.
8This part is based on Lehrer (1988).
9The independence of the axioms in general can be proved analogously as in Casajus (2012).
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Theorem 3.2. Let Λ ∈ L. The Λ-Banzhaf value is the unique value on G that satisfies Λ-dnp
and 2-psp.10
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3.2, uniqueness can be shown by induction. The case
n = 2 follows immediately from 2-psp. The case n = 1 then follows from the case n = 2 by
Λ-dnp. The inductive reasoning for n ≥ 2 is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3.2, as it
only depends on Λ-dnp.
4 Simple Games (and Amalgamation Neutrality)
In this section, we focus our attention on a particular subclass of games in partition function
form, the so-called simple games in partition function form. This subclass comprises those games
where the worth of any embedded coalition takes only one of two values. To be consistent with
the previous literature on simple (coalitional) games, we further demand a certain notion of
monotonicity. Formally, for each N ⊆ Ω and (N, v) ∈ G, we consider the following properties:
(i) For every (S, P ) ∈ ECN , v(S, P ) ∈ {0, 1},
(ii) v(N, {∅, N}) = 1,
(iii) For every S, T ⊆ N and P ∈ P(N) with P = {∅, S, S1, . . . , Sm},
v(S, P ) ≤ v(S ∪ T, {∅, S ∪ T, S1 \ T, . . . , Sm \ T}).
First, (i) requires that an embedded coalition is either winning (and the value is 1) or losing
(and the value is 0). Second, (ii) requires that the grand coalition is always winning. Third,
(iii) requires that a winning embedded coalition S can never become losing when more agents
join it. A game (N, v) ∈ G is a simple game in partition function form (just simple game) if it
satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii). Let SG be the subset of G that consists of simple games.
The class of games just introduced was studied some time ago under the name of multi-
candidate voting games. Two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for this class of games are
proposed in Bolger (1983, 1986). Later on, Bolger (1990) characterized one of his proposals
within the class of values that can be built using a particular weight system. It is worth to
mention that the family of values proposed in the current work does not lie within the class of
values considered by Bolger (1990), although the Λ-Banzhaf value satisfies the dummy player
property of the characterization. Our model should not be confused with the model of games
with r-alternatives (see for instance Freixas and Zwicker (2003)). The latter is a model that
allows for different levels of approval; that is, besides knowing which coalitions are formed, it
is also known what each of the coalitions is voting for. For instance, voting situations where
abstention is present can be modelled using a simple game with 3-alternatives.
10The independence of the axioms is trivial.
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The Λ-Banzhaf value introduced in Section 2 has been proved in Section 3 to be the only value
within the framework of all games in partition function form that is invariant with respect to a
certain amalgamation of players, namely Λ-dnp, and that satisfies an additional property, either
dpp(w) or 2-psp. When we restrict our attention to simple games, however, the aforementioned
amalgamation property makes use of collusion transformation for which simple games are not
closed in general. I.e., given (N, v) ∈ SG a game with externalities, and i, j ∈ N , we have that
(N−j , v(Λ,ij)) is not in general a simple game, as it can be immediately seen from an inspection
of Eq. (8).
In the remaining part of this section, we tackle the imbalance mentioned for simple games
between the above value, on the one hand, and the (desired) amalgamation neutrality property,
on the other hand, by means of three steps. First, we show that there do exist reasonable
amalgamation neutrality properties in the spirit of Λ-dnp that are meaningful in the framework
of simple games. Second, for each Λ that satisfies certain mild properties, we define a new value
for arbitrary partition function form games, which we call the modified Λ-Banzhaf value. This
value is in general different than the Λ-Banzhaf value, although both values coincide when there
are no externalities. Third, we show that the modified Λ-Banzhaf value is the unique value –
either within the framework of simple games or the framework of all games – that satisfies a
certain amalgamation neutrality property and, additionally, either dpp(w) or 2-psp.
4.1 A different amalgamation neutrality property
In the following, we modify the property Λ-dnp in a way that it turns out to be meaningful
within the framework of simple games. To do so, it is convenient to assume that Λ is such
that in many circumstances there is always a unique coalition structure that is the most likely
configuration. Formally, this translates into two technical requirements. First, given N ⊆ Ω
and S ⊆ N , we assume that there exists a unique PN,S ∈ P(N) with S ∈ PN,S such that{
PN,S
}
= arg max
P∈P(N):S∈P
λN (S, P ). (18)
Second, given N ⊆ Ω, j ∈ N and (S, P ) ∈ ECN−j , we assume that there exists a unique
TN,j,(S,P ) ∈ P−S such that{
TN,j,(S,P )
}
= arg max
T∈P−S
λN (S, P−T ∪ T+j). (19)
Additionally, we say that Λ is consistent for simple games if for every N ⊆ Ω, j ∈ N and
S ⊆ N−j ,
arg max
P∈P(N):S∈P
λN (S, P ) = arg max
P∈XN,j,S
λN (S, P ), (20)
where
XN,j,S :=
{
P ′−T ∪ T+j : T ∈ P ′−S , P ′ ∈ arg max
P ′′∈P(N−j):S∈P ′′
λN−j (S, P ′′)
}
. (21)
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Thus, Λ is consistent for simple games if given some S ⊆ N−j , the most likely configuration of
players in N−j \ S according to Λ is independent of whether we consider j or not. We let LSG
denote the set of Λ that satisfy Eqs. (2), (18), (19), and (21).11 We stress that LSG 6= ∅ as it
contains the two Λ defined in Example 2.1.
We are now in the position to introduce the modified {ij}-reduced game, which we denote
by (N−j , v˜(Λ,ij)) ∈ GN−j and is defined, for every (S, P ) ∈ ECN−j , by12
v˜(Λ,ij)(S, P ) =
v(S+j , P−S ∪ S+j) if i ∈ S,v (S, P−T∗ ∪ T ∗+j) if i /∈ S, where T ∗ = TN,j,(S,P ). (22)
It is a matter of straightforward calculations to check that (N−j , v˜(Λ,ij)) is a simple game if (N, v)
is a simple game. When no confusion may arise, we write (N−j , v˜ij) instead of (N−j , v˜(Λ,ij)).
Finally, we consider the following amalgamation neutrality property, which can be seen as
one natural adaptation of Λ-dnp into the framework of simple games.
Λ˜-dnp(s) Let Λ ∈ LSG . A value on H ⊆ G, f, satisfies the Λ-delegation neutrality property for
simple games if for every N ⊆ Ω, (N, v) ∈ GN ∩H, and i, j ∈ N , with i 6= j,
fi(N, v) + fj(N, v) = fi(N−j , v˜(Λ,ij)).
4.2 Another family of values
Next, we introduce a new family of values for arbitrary games, although we focus our attention
primarily on simple games. Indeed, note that given a simple game (N, v) ∈ SG and Λ ∈ LSG , the
coalitional game (N, vΛ) defined in Eq. (5) is not in general a simple game. Given (N, v) ∈ GN
and Λ ∈ LSG , we can alternatively define the game (N, v˜Λ) such that, for each S ⊆ N ,13
v˜Λ(S) = v
(
S, PN,S
)
. (23)
Trivially, (N, v˜Λ) is a simple coalitional game. Using Eq. (23), we can now define a new family
of values, one for every Λ ∈ LSG .
Definition 4.1. Given Λ ∈ LSG, the modified Λ-Banzhaf value, B˜aΛ, is the value defined for
every (N, v) ∈ G and i ∈ N by
B˜aΛi (N, v) =
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N−i
[
v˜Λ(S+i)− v˜Λ(S)
]
. (24)
11Without Eqs. (18) and (19), we would need to assume that P(M), with M ⊆ Ω, can be completely and
exogenously ordered. This complete order would then serve as a tie-breaking rule in the event that two partitions
are equally likely.
12Note that different Λ define the same amalgamation game as long as the relative likelihood of coalition
structures remains unaltered.
13Note that different Λ define the same coalitional game as long as the relative likelihood of coalition structures
remains unaltered.
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It is immediate to check that when (N, v) ∈ G is a coalitional game, i.e., it considers no
externalities, we have B˜aΛ(N, v) = BaΛ(N, v). For arbitrary simple games, however, both values
are in general different.
4.3 More characterization results
We are now in the position to prove two results that characterize the modified Λ-Banzhaf value
within the framework of simple games.
Theorem 4.1. Let Λ ∈ LSG. The modified Λ-Banzhaf value is the only value on SG that
satisfies Λ˜-dnp(s) and dpp(w).
Proof. First, to prove existence, we can simply repeat the proof of Proposition 3.1, which now
hinges on
(˜v˜Λ)ij = (˜v˜ij)
Λ
. (25)
In order to prove Eq. (25), let i, j ∈ N and S ⊆ N−j . We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: i ∈ S.
In this case, let P ∗ := PN−j ,S ∈ P(N−j) be such that S ∈ P ∗ and{
P ∗−S
}
= arg max
P−S∈P(N−j\S)
λN−j (S, P−S ∪ S) = arg max
P−S∈P(N\S+j)
λN (S+j , P−S ∪ S+j),
where the second equality holds by Eq. (2). On the one hand,
(˜v˜Λ)ij(S) = v˜
Λ(S+j) = v(S+j , P ∗−S ∪ S+j).
On the other hand,
(˜v˜ij)
Λ
(S) = v˜ij(S, P ∗) = v(S+j , P ∗−S ∪ S+j).
Therefore, Eq. (25) holds.
Case 2: i /∈ S.
As in the previous case, let P ∗ := PN−j ,S ∈ P(N−j) be such that S ∈ P ∗ and
{P ∗} = arg max
P∈P(N−j):S∈P
λN−j (S, P ).
Additionally, let P ∗∗ := PN,S ∈ P(N) be such that S ∈ P ∗∗ and
{P ∗∗} = arg max
P∈P(N):S∈P
λN (S, P ).
On the one hand,
(˜v˜Λ)ij(S) = v˜
Λ(S) = v (S, P ∗∗) = v
(
S, P ∗∗−T∗∗ ∪ T ∗∗
)
,
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where T ∗∗ ∈ P ∗∗−S is such that j ∈ T ∗∗. On the other hand,
(˜v˜ij)
Λ
(S) = v˜ij(S, P ∗) = v
(
S, P ∗−T∗ ∪ T ∗+j
)
,
where T ∗ = TN,j,(S,P∗), i.e.,
{T ∗} = arg max
T∈P∗−S
λN
(
S, P ∗−T ∪ T+j
)
.
Lastly, from Eqs. (20) and (21) it follows that P ∗∗−T∗∗ = P ∗−T∗ , hence implying that
P ∗∗−T∗∗ ∪ T ∗∗ = P ∗−T∗ ∪ T ∗+j . As a consequence, Eq. (25) holds.
Second, in order to prove uniqueness for n = 2, it suffices to repeat the argument of Corollary
9 in Casajus (2012), noting that his proof for the case n = 2 only considers coalitional games,
i.e. games without externalities. The induction argument is analogous to the proof of Theorem
3.1.
Following the main lines of the proof of the above theorem, we can also obtain the next
result.
Theorem 4.2. Let Λ ∈ LSG. The modified Λ-Banzhaf value is the only value on SG that
satisfies Λ˜-dnp(s) and 2-psp.14
Since the distributions given by Λ ∈ LSG are independent of the game, the modified Banzhaf
value is additive. Moreover, due to the fact that all games defined in (1) constitute a basis of the
vector space of all partition function games with common player set N and, additionally, they
are simple games, the characterization results in Theorems 4.2 and 4.2 extend to the framework
of all games in partition function form.
Corollary 4.1. Let Λ ∈ LSG. The modified Λ-Banzhaf value is the only value on G that satisfies
Λ˜-dnp(s) and dpp(w).
Corollary 4.2. Let Λ ∈ LSG. The modified Λ-Banzhaf value is the only value on G that satisfies
Λ˜-dnp(s) and 2-psp.
In combination with Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, the two above results permit us comparing the
two families of values introduced in this paper. On the one hand, we see that demanding Λ˜-
dnp(s) leads to a value, namely B˜aΛ, defined in a way that the information contained in Λ is
aggregated too abruptly, as opposed to BaΛ, where the information contained in Λ is aggregated
following an average approach.15 On the other hand, B˜aΛ, but not BaΛ, is characterized by the
same two results in the framework of all games and in the framework of simple games. As a
14The independence of the axioms is trivial.
15Of course, there exist other neutrality properties that use different, meaningful collusion transformations for
which simple games are closed. The investigation of other such properties lies outside the scope of this paper.
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consequence, depending on the specific setting where we want to consider our values, either one
or the other value will be more suitable.
Lastly, we want to point out that Theorem 4.2 is interesting from the point of view of the
study of the distribution of power in legislatures. Indeed, we say that i ∈ N has veto power
within (N, v) if v({S, P}) = 1 implies i ∈ S. Then, consider the following property that a value
on SG might satisfy:
2-vpb A value on SG, f, satisfies the veto property for bilateral systems if for every N ⊆ Ω with
n = 2 and (N, v) ∈ SG where only one player, i ∈ N , has veto power,
fi(N, v) = v(N, {∅, N}).
The appeal of the above property within two-party systems is quite obvious – see e.g. May
(1952). Corollary 4.3 below reveals that if we require the latter property to hold for two-party
systems and we want the distribution of power to be (on expectation according to Λ) unaffected
by the party agreements that may subscribed within a multi-party system, only one possibility
remains: the modified Λ-Banzhaf value.
Corollary 4.3. Let Λ ∈ LSG. The modified Λ-Banzhaf value is the only value on SG that
satisfies Λ˜-dnp(s) and 2-vpb.16
Proof. By repeating the induction argument in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can focus our
attention to simple games (N, v) ∈ SG with n = 2. Note that there are only four such games.
Indeed, let w.l.o.g. N = {1, 2}. Then, (N, e(∅,∗)), (N, e({1},∗)), (N, e({2},∗)) and (N, e(N,∗)) are
the only simple games that exist. Moreover, since n = 2, they are all coalitional games. For
coalitional games, Λ˜-dnp(s) implies symmetry for any Λ.17 In particular, for every N with
n = 2 and (N, v) ∈ SG where either all players have veto power or no player does, fi(N, v) =
fj(N, v) for all i, j ∈ N . That is, a value that satisfies Λ˜-dnp(s) and 2-mpb within SG is
uniquely determined for (N, e(∅,∗)), (N, e({1},∗)), (N, e({2},∗)) and (N, e(N,∗)).
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